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Abstract
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is an important branch of secure mul-
tiparty quantum computation. Several schemes for (n, n) threshold QSS
based on quantum Fourier transformation (QFT) have been proposed. In-
spired by the flexibility of (t, n) threshold schemes, Song et al. (Scientific
Reports, 2017) have proposed a (t, n) threshold QSS utilizing QFT . Later,
Kao and Hwang (arXiv:1803.00216) have identified a loophole in the scheme
but have not suggested any remedy. In this present study, we have proposed
a (t, n) threshold QSS scheme to share a d dimensional classical secret. This
scheme can be implemented using local operations (such as QFT , general-
ized Pauli operators and local measurement) and classical communication.
Security of the proposed scheme is described against outsider and partici-
pants’ eavesdropping.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography; Quantum secret sharing; Quantum Fourier
transformation
1 Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) is an important branch of cryptography. In 1979, Shamir [1]
proposed secret sharing scheme to share a secret among several participants in such
a way that a set of authorized participants can reconstruct the secret. In general,
classical secret sharing (CSS) can be classified in (n, n) and (t, n) threshold. In
an (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme all n participants should collaborate
to reconstruct the secret, whereas in a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme the
cardinality of the authorized set is t. (t, n) threshold SS has various applications
in group authentication [2], threshold signature [3, 4], group key agreement [5],
threshold encryption [6], secure multiparty computation [7], etc.
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With the development of quantum cryptography, quantum secret sharing (QSS)
is receiving more and more interest. QSS which is a variation of CSS in quantum
cryptography, uses quantum computation to share and reconstruct the secret.
QSS schemes provide security depending on physical laws, whereas classical ones
usually achieve security based on computational assumptions. Thus QSS schemes
are more reliable. There are two types of QSS: sharing a classical secret and
sharing a quantum secret. Hillery et al. [8] for the first time proposed a QSS
scheme that shares classical secret of a dealer Alice among two participants Bob
and Charlie. In the scheme, Alice, Bob and Charlie share a three particle two
dimensional GHZ state. They measure their own particle randomly in one of the
two directions and announces their measurement basis publicly but not the mea-
surement result. To gain Alice’s measurement result, Bob and Charlie colludes
with their measurement results. This allows them to establish a private key and
hence share a secret. Cleave et al. [9] have proposed another QSS scheme that
shares quantum secret using CSS code [10, 11], a quantum error correcting code.
After that a large number of schemes on QSS have been proposed such as circular
QSSs [12, 13, 14], dynamic QSSs [15, 16], threshold QSSs [17, 18, 19], single par-
ticle QSSs [20, 21, 22], graph state QSSs [23, 24, 25], verifiable QSSs [26, 27, 28]
and QSSs based on error correcting codes [29], phase shift operations [30, 31, 32]
and quantum search algorithms [33].
Yang et al. [34] have shown that the quantum Fourier transformation (QFT)
can be used to propose an (n, n) threshold QSS scheme in which the share of
each participant is protected by true randomness. After having the share (or
private shadow) from the dealer, the participants share an n particle GHZ state
in qudits. Each participant applies QFT followed by a unitary transformation
(depending on private shadow) on his own particle. Then they measure their own
particle and gets the dealer’s secret by adding all the measurement results. But
the share distribution procedure is not described in the scheme. They have only
mentioned that secret is distributed in such a way that summation of the shares
will return the secrets. To reduce the computational cost, Xiao and Gao [35] have
proposed an (n, n) threshold d level QSS scheme based on local operation and
classical communication (LOCC). Similar to [34], the dealer and the n participants
share a (1 + n) particle d dimensional GHZ state. The dealer applies generalized
Pauli Z gate (depending on his secret) on his own particle. Then the dealer
and all the participants apply QFT on their own particles and measure those
in the computational basis. Now, Dealer announces his measurement result and
participants consider their measurement result as their private shadow. Finally,
the participants recover the secret by adding their measurement results along with
dealer’s measurement result.
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The above two QSS schemes based on QFT are (n, n) threshold. Whereas
(t, n) threshold QSS is more flexible than (n, n) threshold QSS. Note that, to
reconstruct the secret for a (t, n) threshold QSS scheme, it requires the partici-
pation of any t participants, whereas all n participants have to contribute in case
of (n, n) threshold. Inspired by the flexibility of (t, n) threshold QSS schemes,
Song et al. [36] have proposed a (t, n) threshold QSS scheme that shares d dimen-
sional classical secret using quantum QFT . Kao and Hwang [37] have identified
that the scheme fails to reconstruct the secret. But, they have not suggested any
improvement of the scheme in [36] to mitigate this loophole.
In this current draft we have revisited the scheme proposed by Song et al. [36]
and a loophole in that scheme. To mitigate the loophole, We have proposed a
(t, n) threshold d-level QSS scheme based on the idea of quantum Fourier trans-
formation on a d-dimensional multi-particle entangled state. We have also verified
the security of the proposed scheme against all possible outsider and participant’s
attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 some correlative
preliminaries are introduced. Section 3 revisits the scheme proposed by Song
et al. [36] and its loophole. Section 4 explains the design of the method for
the proposed scheme. Section 5 proves the correctness. Section 6 analyzes the
security. Section 7 compares our scheme to some of the existing schemes. Finally,
in scetion 8, the conclusion of this paper is given.
2 Preliminaries
Before describing the protocol, here in this section we have introduced some pre-
liminary concepts necessary to describe the protocol, which includes the basic
ideas of quantum Fourier transformation, generalized Pauli operator and the
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme [1]. Note that, for the rest of
our discussion we have used ‘+’ for addition modulo d and ‘·’ for multiplication
modulo d.
2.1 Quantum Fourier Transformation
The quantum Fourier transform (QFT) is a unitary transformation on a quantum
system. For a basis {0, 1, · · · , d− 1} in d dimension, the QFT is defined by
QFT |y〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
x=0
ωy·x |x〉 , (1)
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where ω = e
2pii
d and y ∈ {0, 1, · · ·d−1}. For the same basis, the inverse quantum
Fourier transformation (QFT−1) is defined by
QFT−1 |x〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
y=0
ω−x·y |y〉 , (2)
where x ∈ {0, 1, · · ·d− 1}.
2.2 Generalized Pauli Operator
Let H be a d dimensional Hilbert space with a basis {|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉}. The
generalized Pauli operator on H is defined by
Uα,β =
d−1∑
x=0
ωβ·x |x+ α〉 〈x| . (3)
In particular,
Ul,0 |x〉 = |x+ l〉 , U0,l |x〉 = ωl·x |x〉 , (4)
for l ∈ {0, 1, · · ·d− 1}, are called generalized Pauli X gate and generalized Pauli
Z gate respectively.
2.3 Shamir’s (t, n) threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme [1] for a dealer D and n partici-
pants {P1, P2, · · · , Pn}, consists of following two algorithms:
• Share Distribution Algorithm:
1. The dealer D chooses a prime d such that n ≤ d ≤ 2n and his secret
a0 ∈ Zd. He randomly chooses (a1, a2, · · · , at−1) ∈ Zt−1d and sets a
polynomial of degree t− 1 as f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1.
2. D chooses n nonzero and distinct elements x1, x2, · · · , xn ∈ Zd and
publishes all of them. He sends f(xi) to the ith participant Pi through
the private channel (for i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
• Secret Reconstruction Algorithm:
Any t out of n participants (suppose {P1, P2, · · ·Pt}) takes out their shares
and calculates
a0 =
t∑
i=1
f(xi)
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
xj
xj − xi
(mod d) (5)
to reconstruct the dealer’s secret and shares with other participants.
4
3 Revisiting The Scheme Proposed by Song et
al. and Its Loophole
In this section, we have revisited the (t, n) threshold d-level quantum secret sharing
(QSS) scheme proposed by Song et al. [36] and the loophole as identified by Kao
and Hwang [37].
3.1 Revisiting the scheme proposed by Song et al.
In this scheme a dealer Alice wants to share a secret a0 among n participants
Bob1, Bob2, · · ·, Bobn. There are three phases in this scheme, namely, initializa-
tion phase, share distribution phase and secret reconstruction phase. Initialization
and secret distribution phase exploits the idea of share distribution algorithm of
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. Any set of t participants can re-
construct the secret. For simplicity it is assumed that the selected qualified subset
is denoted by R = {Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobt}. The procedure of secret reconstruction
phase is as follows:
1. Bob1 (a trusted participant) prepares a t particle d-dimensional GHZ state
of the form
|φ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|k〉1 |k〉2 |k〉3 · · · |k〉t (6)
and sends the rth (r = 2, 3, · · · , t) particle to the rth participant through
the authenticate quantum channel.
2. After receiving the particle from Bob1, each Bobr calculates the shadow of
his share f(xr) as
sr = f(xr)
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=r
xj
xj − xr
mod d, (7)
for r = 1, 2, . . . , t.
3. Each participant Bobr performs a generalized Pauli operator U0,sr on his
own particle, for r = 1, 2, · · · , t. Then the system of t qudits becomes:
|φ1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
U0,s1 |k〉1 U0,s2 |k〉2 U0,s3 |k〉3 · · ·U0,st |k〉t
=
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑
t
r=1 sr)·k |k〉1 |k〉2 |k〉3 · · · |k〉t . (8)
5
4. Bob1 applies QFT
−1 on his own particle. He gets dealer’s secret by mea-
suring his particle in computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉} and shares
with other participants.
3.2 Loophole in the above scheme
In the QSS scheme proposed by Song et al. [36] has claimed that at the last step
of secret reconstruction phase, the dealer’s secret can be recovered by applying
QFT−1 on the first particle of |φ1〉 and measuring it in computational basis. Kao
and Hwang [37] have shown that at the end of the secret reconstruction phase,
the participants can not recover the secret. To be specific, after applying QFT−1
on the first particle of |φ1〉 the system of t qudits becomes
|φ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑
t
r=1 sr)·kQFT−1(|k〉1) |k〉2 |k〉3 . . . |k〉t
=
1
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑
t
r=1 sr)·k

 d−1∑
k1=0
ω−k1·k |k1〉1

 |k〉2 |k〉3 . . . |k〉t
=
1
d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
k1=0
ω((
∑
t
r=1 sr)−k1)·k |k1〉1 |k〉2 |k〉3 . . . |k〉t . (9)
It clearly shows that, the particles in |φ2〉 are still entangled. After measuring
the first particle of |φ2〉 in the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉} it results
randomly one of {0, 1, · · · , d−1}. According to the above protocol the participants
consider this as a secret. The measurement result matches with actual secret with
a probability 1
d
. Thus, the above scheme fails to reconstruct the dealer’s secret.
4 The Proposed Scheme
In a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, the dealer, Alice shares a secret (a0)
among n participants {Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobn} in such a way that any set of t par-
ticipants can reconstruct the secret. The secret sharing scheme is proposed in
three phases: initialization phase, share distribution phase and secret reconstruc-
tion phase.
4.1 Initialization Phase
1. According to Bertrand’s postulate [39], for a given n, Alice can find a suitable
prime d satisfying n ≤ d ≤ 2n.
2. Alice sets a finite field F = Zd and her secret a0 ∈ F .
6
3. Alice selects (a1, a2, · · · , at−1) ∈ F t−1 randomly and defines a polynomial of
degree (t− 1) as
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1. (10)
4.2 Distribution Phase
1. Alice chooses n distinct and nonzero values x1, x2, · · · , xn ∈ F and publishes
all the values.
2. Alice calculates f(xi) and sends to the ith participant through a public
channel, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
4.3 Reconstruction Phase
For simplicity, we assume that the set of reconstructor is denoted by R = {Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobt}.
Suppose Bob1 is the trusted participant who initiates the reconstruction phase.
1. Bob1 prepares t sequences S1, S2, · · · , St. Each of the sequence contains
m decoy particles randomly selected from one of the basis among B1 =
{|i〉 : i = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1} (computational basis) and B2 = {QFT (|i〉) : i =
0, 1, · · · , d− 1} (Fourier basis). Then he inserts the ith particle of t-particle
d-dimensional entangled state of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|k〉1 |k〉2 · · · |k〉t (11)
in to the sequence Si in a random position and sends the new sequence S
′
i
to the ith participant, for i = 2, 3, · · · , t.
2. After the announcement of Bobi (i = 2, 3, · · · , t) that he receives the se-
quence of particles S
′
i, Bob1 tells the position and the measurement basis
of decoy photons. Now, Bobi uses the correct basis to measure the cor-
responding decoy photons and declares half of the measurement results to
Bob1. Then, Bob1 announces the initial states of the remaining half of de-
coy photons. Finally, they check whether the measurement results of decoy
photons are consistent with their initial states or not. If the error rate is
greater than a predetermined threshold value, they will abort the protocol;
otherwise, they will proceed to the next step.
3. Bobi (i = 2, 3, · · · , t) discards all decoy photons from S
′
i and be left with the
ith particle of |ψ〉. Now, Bobi (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) calculates his shadow si from
his private share f(xi) and public values x1, x2, · · · , xn by
si = f(xi)
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
xj
xj − xi
(mod d). (12)
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Then, he applies generalized Pauli X-gate (depending on his shadow) fol-
lowed by QFT on his own particle and measures it in computational basis
{|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉}. Finally, he announces his measurement result Mi to
Bob1 through a public classical channel.
4. Now, Bob1 gets a
′
0 by calculating
a′0 =
t∑
i=1
Mi (13)
and shares it to the other participants. If the participants do not trust
each other, they request the dealer Alice to send the hash value of the secret
H(a0) for a known hash function H(·) and they verify H(a
′
0) = H(a0). If this
equation holds, they consider a0 as Alice’s secret otherwise they conclude
that there is at least one dishonest participant.
5 Correctness of Proposed Scheme
In this section we will show that the shared secret can perfectly be reconstructed
after the secret reconstruction phase. After having the ith (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) particle
of |ψ〉, Bobi performs the quantum Fourier transformation (QFT) on his own
particle, then the system of t qudits will be of the form
|ψ1〉 = 1
d
t+1
2
d−1∑
k=0

 d−1∑
l1=0
ωkl1 |l1〉

⊗

d−1∑
l2=0
ωkl2 |l2〉

⊗ · · · ⊗

d−1∑
lt=0
ωklt |lt〉

 , (14)
where ω = e
2pii
d . Now, Bobi calculates his shadow si and applies Usi,0 on his own
particle, then the system of t particles will be in the form:
|ψ2〉 = 1
d
t−1
2
∑
l1+l2+···+lt=0
|l1 + s1〉 |l2 + s2〉 · · · |lt + st〉 . (15)
Now, each participants Bobi, measures his particle in the computational basis
{|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉} and gets the measurement result asMi = (li+si) such that
l1 + l2 + · · ·+ lt = 0. Bobi (i = 2, 3, · · · , t) sends their measurement result Mi to
Bob1. Now, Bob1 calculates (M1 +M2 + · · ·+Mt) and get Alice’s secret a0, as
t∑
i=0
Mi = (l1 + s1) + (l2 + s2) + · · ·+ (lt + st)
= s1 + s2 + · · ·+ st
=

f(x1) ∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=1
xj
xj − x1

+

f(x2) ∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=2
xj
xj − x2

+ · · ·+

f(xt) ∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=t
xj
xj − xt


= a0. (16)
Thus, by performing the steps described in secret reconstruction phase any set
of t participants among n can recover the dealer’s secret.
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6 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of proposed (t, n) threshold d level secret sharing
scheme is analyzed. We will show that, the proposed protocol can defend both
outsider and participant’s attack.
6.1 Outside Attack
• Intercept and Resend Attack
Suppose an eavesdropper Eve intercepts the particle sent by Bob1 to Bobi (i =
2, 3, · · · , t) and resends a sequence of forged particles to Bobi to gain some infor-
mation. Each particle of the GHZ state is inserted in a sequence of decoy particles
which are randomly chosen from computational basis and Fourier basis. Now, an
outside eavesdropper Eve does not know the position and measurement bases of
decoy particles. So he will choose the basis randomly to measure the decoy parti-
cle. It will introduce an error with a probability d−1
2d
for each decoy photon. In the
scheme, we have m decoy photons in each sequence. Thus, the eavesdropper Eve
will be detected with a probability 1−(d+1
2d
)m. Which will be close to 1 for largem.
• Entangle and Measure Attack
In this kind of attack, the attacker, Eve uses a unitary operation UE to entangle
an ancillary particle with the transmitted quantum state and then measures the
ancillary particle to steal secret information. Let us assume that the ancillary
particles prepared by Eve are E = (|E1〉 , |E2〉 , · · ·) and the effects of the unitary
operation UE performed on the decoy particles are shown as follows:
UE |j〉 |Ei〉 =
d−1∑
k=0
ajk |k〉
∣∣ejk〉 , (17)
where
∑d−1
k=0|ajk|
2= 1 and the d2 states {|ejk〉 : j, k = 0, 1, · · · , d − 1} are de-
termined by the unitary operation UE, for j = 0, 1, · · · , d − 1. In order to avoid
the eavesdropping check, Eve has to set ajk = 0, for j 6= k if the decoy particles
are in the computational basis B1 = {|i〉 : i = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1}. Let us denote
|j′〉 = QFT (|j〉). Now,
UE
∣∣j′〉 |Ei〉 = d−1∑
p=0
(
d−1∑
k=0
ω(j−p)kakk |ekk〉
) ∣∣p′〉 . (18)
When the decoy particles are in the Fourier basis B2 = {QFT (|i〉) : i =
0, 1, · · · , d− 1} = {|i′〉 : i = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1}, Eve has to set
d−1∑
k=0
ω(j−p)kakk |ekk〉 = 0, (19)
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for p, j = 0, 1, · · · , d−1 and p 6= j. Now, it is a system of homogeneous equations
with d variables {akk |ekk〉 : k = 0, 1, · · ·d− 1}. Solving the system, we have
a00 |e00〉 = a11 |e11〉 = · · · = a(d−1),(d−1)
∣∣e(d−1),(d−1).〉 (20)
Hence, Eve cannot distinguish between
a00 |e00〉 , a11 |e11〉 , · · · , a(d−1),(d−1)
∣∣e(d−1),(d−1)〉
and thus cannot get useful information by measuring the ancillary particles. So,
the entangle-and-measure attack is defended by the scheme successfully.
• Man in Middle Attack
In this type of attack, Eve intercepts or destroys some particles and sends some
forged particles, but the legitimate parties think that they are communicating di-
rectly. As Eve does not know the position of decoy particles, security analysis of
the scheme against this attack is very similar to the intercept and resend attack.
To resist this type of attack one can also introduce quantum identity authenti-
cation which authenticate a legitimate party and provide an outside attacker to
impersonate a participant to communicate with others.
• Trojan Horse Attack
In the proposed scheme, photons are used to transmit the information. There
are two types of trojan horse attack: invisible photon attack and delay photon
attack. To defend invisible photon attack, the participants should add a filter
before their devices to allow only the photon signals whose wavelengths are close
to the operating one to come in. In order to prevent the delay photon attack,
the participants randomly select a subset of the received photon signals as sam-
ple signals and split each sampling signal with a photon number splitter (PNS)
and measure the two signals with the base B1 = {|i〉 : i ∈ 0, 1, · · · , d− 1} and
B2 = {QFT (|i〉) : i ∈ 0, 1, · · · , d− 1} randomly. If the multi-photon rate is un-
reasonably high, the transmission should be terminated and be repeated again
from the beginning.
6.2 Participant’s Attack
In a multiparty scheme, it is also possible to have an attack from the participants.
A participants’ attack is generally more powerful than an outsider attack and thus
it needs more attention. In 2007, Gao et al. [38] first analyzed the participants’
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attack for a multiparty quantum cryptographic protocol. Here, we will discuss the
participants’ attack from a single dishonest participant and the colluding attack
from two or more dishonest participants.
• The Participant Attack from a Single dishonest participant
To perform an attack, a dishonest participant Bobj (for j ∈ {2, 3, · · ·n}) in-
tercepts the particle sequence Sj′, which is sent to Bobj′, (j ∈ {2, 3, · · · t} and
j′ 6= j) from Bob1. As he does not know the position and measurement basis of
decoy particles he will be caught as an outsider eavesdropper. If he listens to the
measurement result Mj′ , then also he can not get Bobj′ ’s shadow sj′ (or private
share f(xj′)) as he does not know the value of lj′. So, Bobj (for j ∈ {2, 3, · · ·n})
can not get the secret alone or gain any information about other’s private share.
A dishonest participant Bobj , for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · t} can measure his particle in
computational basis after receiving the particles from Bob1, to steal some private
information of other participants or to get the secret alone. Then the system of t
qudits will be of the form |i〉1 |i〉2 · · · |i〉t, where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}, i.e., if Bobj
gets the state |i〉 after measurement, then he knows that the state of all other
participants is also |i〉. Now, after applying Usr,0QFT by each participant Bobr
(r ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}), the system of t qudits will be of the form
1
d
t
2
d−1∑
l1,l2,···,lt=0
ωj(l1+l2+···+lt) |l1 + s1〉 |l2 + s2〉 · · · |lt + st〉 (21)
Then Bobr gets the measurement result Mr = lr + sr (for r = 1, 2, · · · , t), where
l1, l2, · · · , lt ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}. Now, Bob1 will calculates
a′0 =
t∑
r=0
Mr =
t∑
r=0
(lr + sr) = a0 +
t∑
r=0
lr . (22)
It clearly shows that, in general a0 6= a
′
0 and a
′
0 matches with a0 only when∑t
r=0 lr = 0, which occurs with a probability d
−( t−2
2
). So, due to the participant’s
attack, the recovered secret is different from dealer’s secret. But, the attack
can be detected at the last step of the scheme when honest participants verify
H(a0) = H(a
′
0).
It is also possible that, after recovering the secret, Bob1 reads the secret and
sends a forged value to other participants. Then also the participants can detect
the eavesdropping from the hash value condition.
• The colluding attack from (t− 1) or less dishonest participants
In the proposed scheme, Alice considers a (t − 1) degree polynomial f(x) and
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her secret is a0 = f(0). To calculate f(0) for a secret polynomial f(x), it is
required to have a knowledge about the value of f(x) for t nonzero and distinct
values of x. The dealer shares n values of f(x) for n distinct and nonzero values of
x with the participants in private. So, a set of (t− 1) or less participants can not
obtain dealer’s secret’s secret. It is also impossible to gain personal information
of a participant by colluding two or more participants.
7 Comparison
Table 1: Comparison of QSS schemes based on QFT
Yang et al. [34] Xiao and Gao [35] Our Scheme
(t, n) or (n, n) threshold (n, n) (n, n) (t, n)
No. of particles in GHZ state n n+ 1 t
No. of QFT applied n n+ 1 t
No. of unitary operations n 1 t
No. of measurement operations n n+ 1 t
Use of hash function no no yes
Use of decoy particles no yes yes
Yang et al. [34] has introduced the quantum Fourier transformation in quantum
secret sharing. They have proposed an (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme that
shares a classical secret in higher dimension. After having the shares of dealer’s
secret, the participants share an n particle d-dimensional GHZ state. Then the rth
(r = 1, 2, · · · , n) participant performs quantum Fourier transformation, a unitary
operation as generalized Pauli operator U0,sr and single particle measurement on
his own particle respectively. Finally the participants gets the dealer’s secret
by calculating the sum of their measurement results. In their protocol secret
distribution phase is not described.
Xiao and Gao [35] has proposed a (n, n) threshold d-level quantum secret
sharing scheme. This scheme uses local operations to share the secret and only
classical communication to reconstruct it. At first the dealer prepares d dimen-
sional (n+1)-particle GHZ state. He keeps the first particle with him and shares
the other n particles with n participants. Then the dealer applies the unitary
transformation U0,β on his own particle, where β is the dealer’s secret. After
that, all the participants and dealer applies quantum Fourier transformation on
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their own particle and measures their own particles in computational basis. After
knowing the dealer’s measurement result, the participants will recover the secret
by adding their measurement results along with dealer’s.
The above two proposals of QSS using QFT are with (n, n) structure. As (t, n)
threshold QSS schemes are more flexible than (n, n) ones, Song et al. [36] has
proposed a QSS scheme that shares d dimensional classical secret. Note that the
output of the secret reconstruction phase for the scheme described in [36], differs
from the dealer’s secret with a high probability [37]. Thus, we have proposed
(t, n) threshold d-level QSS based on QFT to overcome this loophole. We have
compared the performance of our protocol with the above QSS schemes using
QFT in the Table 1.
So our proposed (t, n) threshold d-level scheme is more flexible, universal and
practical than other QSS schemes that uses quantum Fourier transformation.
8 Conclusion
In summary, we have proposed a (t, n) threshold d-level QSS scheme based on
QFT . The scheme uses Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to distribute the shares
among participants. QFT , generalized Pauli Z gate on d-dimensional n parti-
cle entangled state and single particle measurements on all t particles are used
to reconstruct the dealer’s secret. This scheme can defend several outsider and
participants’ attack. Our scheme is more general and practical than other QSS
protocols exploiting QFT .
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